In 2008, Guo et al. have shown that Lu and Cao's simple three-party protocol for passwordauthenticated key exchanges (S-3PAKE) is indeed completely insecure against a kind of manin-the-middle attack and the undetectable on-line password guessing attack. In addition, they have provided an improved protocol (G-3PAKE) that addresses the identified security problems. However, this paper demonstrates G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack by any other client.
Introduction
To apply two-party password-based authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocols to a large scale peer-to-peer system, 2PAKE protocols have a common problem, that is, each pair of communication parties in a group needs to pre-share a secret. It means that each user has to keep a large number of secrets for communicating with a group of users. To solve this problem, various three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols were proposed ( [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] ). In the 3PAKE protocols, a trusted server assists each pair of users to authenticate each other and share a session key. In addition, the user does not need to keep a large number of secrets for a group of users. With the server's help, each user only shares one secret with the server in 3PAKE protocols.
Because users usually choose easy-to-remember passwords, PAKE protocols can be vulnerable to password guessing attacks. Unlike typical private keys, the password has limited entropy, and is constrained by the memory of the user. For example, one alphanumerical character has 6 bits of entropy. Therefore, the goal of the attacker, which is to obtain a legitimate communication party's password, can be achieved within a reasonable time. Thus, the password guessing attacks on PAKE protocols should be considered realistic. In general, the password guessing attacks can be divided into three classes (Kim et al. [5] , Ding et al. [6] ):
• Detectable on-line password guessing attacks: an attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an on-line transaction. He/she verifies the correctness of his/her guess using the response from server. A failed guess can be detected and logged by the server.
• Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks: similar to above, an attacker tries to verify a password guess in an online transaction. However, a failed guess cannot be detected and logged by server, as the server is not able to distinguish an honest request.
• Off-line password guessing attacks: an attacker guesses a password and verifies his/her guess off-line. No participation of server is required, so the server does not notice the attack from a malicious one.
In 2007, Lu and Cao ( [1] ) proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (S-3PAKE) protocol, where two clients, each shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server, can construct a secure session key. They argued that their S-3PAKE protocol can resist against various known attacks. In 2008, Guo et al. ([4] ), however, have shown that Lu and Cao's S-3PAKE protocol is indeed completely insecure against a kind of man-inthe-middle attack and the undetectable on-line password guessing attack. In addition, they have provided an improved protocol (G-3PAKE) that addresses the identified security problems. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack ( [3, 4, 7] ) by any other client.
A review of G-3PAKE protocol
This section briefly reviews G-3PAKE protocol ([4] ).
Notations
• S , A, B: a trusted server and two clients, respectively.
• pw A , pw B : the password shared between A and S and between B and S , respectively.
• k AS , k BS : the MAC key shared between A and S and between B and S , respectively.
• G, g, p: a finite cyclic group G generated by an element g of prime order p.
• M, N: two elements in G.
• x ∈ Z * p : randomly choosing an element x of Z * p .
• MAC(·): a message authentication code.
• H 1 (·), H 2 (·): two secure one-way hash functions.
• ||: a bitwise concatenation.
Protocol description
Assume that two clients A and B wish to agree on a common session key. As they do not hold any shared information in advance, they cannot directly authenticate each other and have to resort to the trusted server S . The detailed steps of the G-3PAKE protocol, as shown in Fig. 1 , are described as follows: Step 1. To establish a MAC key k AS , a secure 2PAKE protocol is executed between A and S .
Step 2. To establish a MAC key k BS , a secure 2PAKE protocol is executed between B and S .
Step 
Cryptanalysis of G-3PAKE protocol
This section shows that G-3PAKE protocol is insecure to an undetectable on-line password guessing attack ( [3, 4] ), where a malicious client B of G-3PAKE is able to legally gain information about the password by repeatedly and indiscernibly asking queries to the authentication server. The attack scenario is outlined in Fig. 2 . A more detailed description of the attack is as follows:
Shared Information: A, B, S , G, g, p, M, N Step 1. A operates as specified in the G-3PAKE protocol in the first step.
Step 2. Let B be a malicious client mediating between S and A. Upon receiving A||X||δ A from the client A in Step 3 of the G-3PAKE protocol in Fig. 1 , B first randomly generatesX andα, then sendsX ||α to A as a message of Step 7 of the G-3PAKE protocol in Fig. 1 . A would verifyα. Even A may detect only once thatα is invalid, it really does not mean that S detects a failure of B's malicious trial.
Step = g x yz . If the check passes, then B confirms that the guessed password pw * A is the correct one.
Step 6. Otherwise, B repeatedly performs the above Steps 3-5 without being noticed by S .
Experiment to verify the proposed attack: The typical pentium computer can search ≈ 17 * 10 9 password in an hour and the supercomputer (≈ 70 * 10 12 per second) can search ≈ 252 * 10 15 password in an hour ( [7] ). In the case of the undetectable on-line password guessing attacks, additionally time is needed for the round trip delay time between the malicious user B and the server S as shown in Fig. 2 , beside the guessing attack costs. Based on the proposed experiment (for the detail, please refer to our previous experiment ( [7] )), we can see that the proposed password guessing attacks are feasible.
Conclusions
Three-party authenticated key exchange technology has been widely deployed in various kinds of applications. In 2008, Guo et al. proposed an improved three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (G-3PAKE) protocol. However, we have demonstrated that G-3PAKE protocol still falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack by any other client. For this reason, G-3PAKE protocol is insecure for practical application.
